Google, the world’s leading technology giant, recently proposed a compromise plan to deal with the US Department of Justice’s antitrust lawsuit against its search business. After defeating Google in an antitrust trial earlier this year, the US Department of Justice recently proposed a series of comprehensive reforms to Google’s search business. The Department of Justice requires Google to sell its Chrome browser, share search results with other search engines, and avoid exclusive agreements with companies such as Apple for default search positions. The Department of Justice even reserves the possibility of forcing the sale of the Android operating system.
Now, Google has responded to this with a simpler compromise plan: only such default search position agreements are prohibited, and only for three years, in response to the Department of Justice’s concerns about Google’s AI-driven search tools and chatbots that squeeze out competitors.
Google’s Simplified Plan
As the infrastructure of the Internet, the market share and influence of search engines cannot be ignored. However, with the rapid development of AI technology, Google’s dominance in the search field has been challenged. Competitors have launched their own search engines in the hope of getting a piece of the pie. Against this background, Google has been accused of illegally monopolizing the online search market, which has also attracted the attention of the public and regulators. Google pays Apple a huge fee every year in exchange for being the default search engine in the Safari browser. When users search in the Safari address bar, Google Search is used by default (unless users manually change the setting). This is a good deal for Google because it can get huge search traffic from Apple users and use it to serve ads to them. Apple users are also of special value to advertisers because of their above-average income.
The court has previously ruled that Google illegally monopolized the online search market, and its remedies are aimed at reshaping the market so that competitors can compete fairly. Google disagrees that it constitutes a monopoly, but before appealing that basic conclusion, the company is trying to minimize its losses if it loses the case.
Google argues that the search agreement is at the heart of the case, so the court should restrict it with this goal. Under the plan, Google cannot reach agreements with Android phone manufacturers to require the addition of mobile search in exchange for access to other Google applications, nor can it require phone manufacturers to exclude competing search engines or third-party browsers.
Perhaps the biggest concession is that the agreement will explicitly end the long-standing multi-billion-dollar search agreement between Google and Apple. The agreement would prohibit Google from entering into any agreement in the U.S. that would make Google Search the default engine for any Apple-proprietary feature or function, including Siri and Spotlight — unless the agreement allows Apple to choose a different default search engine on its browser each year and explicitly allows it to promote other search engines. In response to the Justice Department’s concerns that Google is crowding out rivals’ AI-driven search tools and chatbots, Google proposed that it should be prohibited from requiring phone makers to add its Gemini Assistant mobile app to access other Google products.
What Google and Its Rivals Think
The U.S. government had previously proposed a ten-year limit, but Google’s counterproposal was only three years. The company argued that more restrictions were unnecessary because the pace of innovation in search is so fast, and regulating a fast-changing industry like search would slow innovation. Google also suggested that greater flexibility could better help other search services compete with Google for Apple’s business. Google proposed that the iPhone and iPad could have different default search engines, suggesting that Google would bid on one platform while competitors bid on the other.
If the court accepts Google’s simplified plan instead of the Justice Department’s, the company may lose some lucrative or strategically advantageous deals, but its business will remain intact. Google does not have to divest its Chrome browser or face the threat of forced sale of Android. Nor does it need to share many of the underlying signals that help it determine how to provide useful search results, allowing competitors to catch up with Google and pose real competitive pressure as the Justice Department hopes.
While this proposal creates more obvious business continuity for Google, it has also triggered strong opposition from competitors. DuckDuckGo, a competitor of Google, bluntly stated that Google’s proposal actually attempts to maintain the status quo, making few fundamental changes and continuing to dominate the search market. For the general public, whether such a proposal can really effectively promote fair competition in the market is still worth pondering.
In summary, although Google’s compromise is an attempt, whether it can really solve the problem still needs to be observed in the subsequent implementation. For antitrust litigation, only through market competition and legal means can fair competition in the market be protected and technological innovation and development be promoted.
