On September 9, 2025, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi held high-level talks with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi in Cairo, Egypt. This was the first direct meeting between the two sides since the massive Israeli-US airstrike, codenamed “Midnight Hammer,” on Iran’s key nuclear facilities in June. The meeting aimed to resolve the significant political and security crisis triggered by the strike through diplomatic channels. The following day, the two sides jointly announced a technical agreement on resuming nuclear inspections and cooperation.
The airstrike inflicted severe damage on Iran’s nuclear program. Satellite imagery revealed a six-meter-diameter crater at the Fordow underground uranium enrichment facility, severely damaging its internal structures. Following the attack, the IAEA withdrew all its inspectors from Iran in early July, bringing the oversight mechanism to a standstill.
In response, the Iranian parliament passed the Anti-Nuclear Terrorism Law on June 25, explicitly requiring all international inspections to be approved by Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. The law marked a formal shift in Iran’s nuclear policy toward a “security-first” approach and reflected the prevailing hardline domestic political stance following the military strike.
Key Points of the Agreement
With Egypt’s active mediation, Araghchi and Grossi held a day-long closed-door negotiation. Although the full text of the agreement has not been made public, Araghchi emphasized that it “effectively addresses Iran’s national security concerns” and establishes a clear framework for future cooperation. He also warned that the agreement would automatically terminate if Iran were again subjected to “any hostile actions.” This statement reveals the complex political maneuvering and lack of mutual trust behind the agreement.
Grossi, in turn, described the agreement as “technical” and praised it on social media as “an important step in the right direction.” He revealed that the two sides have reached an agreement on the specific operational procedures for resuming inspections, hoping to reduce the possibility of further military conflict.
Analysts point out that the IAEA made certain compromises, such as suspending verification of the number of centrifuges at Natanz in exchange for Iran’s access to the Fordow underground laboratory, reflecting a strategy of “trading space for time.”
Iran’s Core Demands
It has been revealed that Iran insisted on three core demands during the negotiations: establishing a dynamic security assessment mechanism and requiring the IAEA to submit counter-terrorism attack plans; implementing Iranian intelligence background checks on inspectors to prevent “infiltration inspections”; and demanding that the IAEA and the five permanent members of the Security Council provide a “commitment of anti-terrorism protection,” failing which Iran reserves the right to “preemptive” self-defense.
These demands are directly based on the lessons learned from the June attack and previous incidents in which Israeli agents disguised as inspectors infiltrated nuclear facilities. They also demonstrate Iran’s resolute assertion of its security interests within the current international political structure.
Egypt’s Geopolitical Role
The Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the agreement was the result of its “intensive diplomatic efforts” aimed at easing tensions between Iran and Europe and advocating for a diplomatic solution to the dispute. During his visit, Araghchi also met with Egyptian President Sisi and then traveled to Tunisia, demonstrating Iran’s active expansion of its strategic presence in North Africa.
Reports indicate that Egypt is secretly discussing a natural gas pipeline project with Iran, aiming to build an “Iran-Egypt-Europe” energy corridor to reduce its dependence on Israeli natural gas.
International Concerns and Proliferation Risks
The IAEA has repeatedly warned that it is unable to verify the status and location of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles since the suspension of inspections. The latest report indicates that Iran’s highly enriched uranium reserves have tripled the limit stipulated in the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, and the Arak heavy water reactor has been restarted, further increasing the risk of nuclear proliferation.
Several European countries have initiated the process of restoring sanctions on Iran, but significant divisions have emerged within the EU, reflecting the West’s divergent political strategies regarding the Iranian nuclear issue. Germany’s Siemens Energy has signed a nuclear facility repair agreement with Iran, and France’s Total Energy plans to participate in the development of the South Pars gas field, highlighting the divergence between economic pragmatism and diplomatic pressure.
Implementation Challenges
While the agreement lays the foundation for resuming inspections and cooperation, its implementation faces multiple challenges both domestically and internationally. Hardline elements in Iran continue to distrust the IAEA, while some countries, led by the United States, have explicitly opposed any arrangements that weaken the inspection mechanism.
The international community commends the role of countries like Egypt and China in promoting dialogue, but a true resolution to the Iranian nuclear issue still requires all parties to work together towards mutual political trust and security.
